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## **Ideas Matter in Inter-Korean Relations: Shifts in South Korea's Foreign Policy Interests and Behavior vis-à-vis North Korea**

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### **Introduction**

It should go without saying, but is in fact frequently overlooked amid US-North Korea nuclear brinksmanship and diplomacy, as well as US-China regional great power competition—the most important factor in the long-term fate of the Korean peninsula is the intent and actions of the two principals: South and North Korea. North Korea's strategy in this regard is relatively well-known and institutionally fixed given the nature of the political system. Pyongyang officially seeks unification via a negotiated confederation as the first step. (Richey 2017). The case of South Korea is arguably more intriguing as it experiences greater and more frequent domestic political shifts. The political vicissitudes of the Korean peninsula implicate alterations in Seoul's domestic political orientation and prevailing ideas about how it should interact with Pyongyang's peninsula and regional strategy. This affects both inter-Korean relations and Northeast Asian regional stability and the US-South Korea alliance.

This chapter analyzes the extent to which democratic regime changes in South Korea, understood as an electorally legitimate shift between conservative and progressive administrations (Hagan 1989, 144-145), alter the country's foreign policy ideas, interests, and behavior vis-à-vis North Korea (see also Brommesson and Ekengren 2013, 4). More specifically, the objective is to test whether and how the aforementioned administration changes, even when controlling for structural international system changes, have significant, sustainable implications for Seoul's foreign policy and strategy toward Pyongyang (Hagan 1989, 143).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In this study, we treat South Korea's North Korea policies as de-facto foreign policies and, accordingly, employ foreign policy analysis to analyze them. Inter-Korean relations are at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policies, with both countries claiming to be the sole legitimate government on the peninsula and officially

Since the late 1990s, South Korea's North Korea policy changes have not correlated well with significant structural changes on the Korean peninsula or stimuli coming from North Korea. Rather, South Korea's North Korea policies have fluctuated significantly following democratic regime changes. These policies have become very divisive elements of the agendas of political elites and in public opinion in South Korea since democratization in 1988. It is not an exaggeration to say that views and policies towards North Korea are the main dividing lines between the progressives and the conservatives of the South (Ryu 2012, 59). Against this background, we argue that ideas and ideologies as collective ideas have played a significant role in the radical changes South Korea has made to its North Korea policies, and that these ideas and ideologies correspond well with its democratic changes in the ideological orientation of the administration in power.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce our theoretical framework, while section three provides a background to the inter-Korean social and cultural exchanges we use to operationalize South Korea's North Korea policies. In the fourth section, we first address alternative explanations, which suggest that South Korea's shifts in its North Korea policy are due to structural changes on the Korean peninsula, stimuli coming from the North or external pressure from the US. Following this, we analyze similarities in and the differences between progressive and conservative administrations in terms of their foreign policy ideas along three dimensions: their worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. In the conclusion, we discuss our findings and suggest implications for inter-Korean relations going forward, and international relations and foreign policy analysis scholarship more generally.

### **Worldviews, Principled Beliefs, and Causal Beliefs**

The role of political elites and their ideas in states' foreign policy behavior have been central to foreign policy analysis (Hudson 2014; Kaarbo 2015). Their approach is built on analyzing in depth a specific state in such a way that it is possible to identify who and/or what played significant roles in certain foreign policy decisions. Going beyond whether ideas matter in international politics, Goldstein and Keohane (1993; Keohane 2000, 129) suggest a framework to analyze *how* ideas matter. In their framework, ideas, defined as "beliefs held by individuals" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3), are conceptualized along three planes: worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. Worldviews are ideas that work in the background but have the broadest impact on behavior. They evoke deep emotions and loyalties based on identities such as

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aspiring to unify since the division. Nevertheless, the two countries treat each other as de-facto sovereign nations, both being members of international organizations, including the United Nations, and also having been diplomatically recognized simultaneously by most countries since the early 1990s. These unique characteristics make it appropriate to use foreign policy analysis in our study, as it rests on the intersection of international relations and domestic politics.

religious faith or deeply held political perspectives. Principled beliefs are normative ideas that construct an understanding of right or wrong. They help translate a worldview into more specific, actionable guidelines. Finally, causal beliefs, also known as cognitive ideas, convert normative principles into strategies about how to achieve policy goals, reflecting cause-and-effect relationships. Policy changes are more likely to occur at this level as worldviews and principles are less prone to change.

Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4) treat ideas as having causal weight in explaining countries' foreign policy behavior. To show that ideas matter in international politics, their null hypothesis puts forward the idea that variation in foreign policy behavior over time in a country "is entirely accounted for by changes *other than ideas*" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 6). In other words, for the hypothesis that ideas matter in international politics to be wrong, the changes in foreign policy behavior must only reflect self-interests that are informed by the balance of power and changes in interests not accounted for by changes in people's ideas (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 26-27). Jervis (1994, 908) criticizes Goldstein and Keohane's null hypothesis as it "makes a straw man of the materialist position," suggesting that "any factor will look important if we attribute all the unexplained variance to it." Risse-Kappen (1994, 214) argues that the egocentric utility maximizer model of Goldstein and Keohane's power-based analysis is underdetermined, as it does not address how actors construct their interests against the background of structural conditions. Wendt (1994, 1041) suggests that Goldstein and Keohane's null hypothesis only allows researchers to find out that ideas matter but not *how* they matter and suggests going one step further by analyzing whether ideas shape not only behavior but also interests.

It is possible that international actors may sometimes adopt pro-social behavior in the absence of material and direct threats or inducements, but such behavioral change does not necessarily mean that their interests have also changed (Ayhan 2020). Actors may sometimes change their behavior due to external social influences; but this does not necessarily mean they have internalized the adopted norm or behavior; i.e. they may publicly conform to a position or behavior without privately accepting it (Johnston 2001, 499-506; Lebow 2005, 556; Bially Mattern 2005, 602).

Most constructivists, particularly discursive and sociological institutionalists, oppose Goldstein and Keohane, and, for that matter, other rational institutionalists' assumption that objective interests and subjective ideas are separable (Adler 2005; Berman 2013; Boudon 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ipek 2015; Risse-Kappen 1994; Schmidt 2008). Howe (1994, 4) suggests that learning (i.e. ideas) places value on what is desirable, or as Wendt (1992, 123) put it "[b]eliefs define and direct material needs." This view considers actors' rationality as cognitive rather than exclusively instrumental, explaining behavior by analyzing its meaning to actors (Adler 2005, 77; Boudon 2003, 18). This does not imply rejection of the idea of material reality or material-interest-based action, but definition of national interests is taken as also being the product of ideas about interests (Schmidt 2008, 318-319). Through worldviews and principled beliefs, foreign policy decision-makers interpret and construct national interests, and causal beliefs lead

them to pursue these interests, while taking into account the material consequences. In other words, intersubjective ideas directly shape the possibilities for both material interests and, in turn, foreign policy behavior in the decision-making process (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 406; Flibbert 2006, 329; Hagan 1989, 146; Ipek 2015, 178; Risse 2011, 593). Foreign policy behavior can also reinforce and strengthen previously held beliefs by creating institutionalized path dependence.

We cannot expect to have absolute notions about truth and rationality, but only an actor's own system of reasoning, a bounded rationality, particularly when outcomes are not clear (Boudon 2003, 17). Therefore, foreign policy analysts must make sense of actors' policies in terms of their principled and causal beliefs under conditions of uncertainty where the outcomes of decisions are not directly observable (Schmidt 2008, 319). The uncertainty of the actual outcomes of foreign policy decisions increases the explanatory power of the agents' beliefs in their interpretations and constructions of their interests and the expected outcomes of their actions. Expectations highly depend on the causal beliefs that help foreign policy decision-makers reduce uncertainty and determine the means and strategies they need to reach their goals (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13-17). Frames surrounding the expected outcomes constitute policy paradigms that are based on cognitive assumptions (Kangas, Niemelä, and Varjonen 2014, 77). Frames in this sense are also normative constructs, reflecting the principled beliefs that help policy elites legitimize their decisions to the public (Kangas, Niemelä, and Varjonen 2014, 77). The normative nature of principled ideas helps decision-makers shift attention from purely instrumental issues focused on material calculations to moral issues that enable them to act decisively, undeterred by causal uncertainty (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 16-17).

Ideas cause change in foreign policy action when policymaking elites make their decisions based on the roadmap provided by their principled and causal beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 8) which, in turn, shape their interests. Ideas shape decision-making because the intersubjective interests and chosen pathway provide the agents with a reasoned discourse that excludes alternative interpretations of the situation and leads them to some decisions rather than others (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11-12). It is sometimes the case that a government change can shift the established foregoing roadmap based on principled and causal beliefs of the incoming government. In other words, a regime change across opposite ends of the political spectrum can lead to dramatic changes in foreign policy, despite the relative absence of structural shifts in the security environment. These dramatic changes in foreign policy behavior would ostensibly be due to how the outgoing and incoming governments' ideologies define the country's interests which, in turn, shape its behavior (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 17-18; Hagan 1989, 143-146).

Goldstein and Keohane's rational choice assumptions reduce ideas and institutions to individuals' ideas, i.e., to common knowledge, while collective knowledge, such as discourses and ideologies, are overlooked, thereby leading to a knowledge gap in how ideas matter in world politics (Jervis 1994, 908; Wendt 1994, 1041). However, their conceptualization is still relevant if collective knowledge, which is not reducible to common knowledge (Berman 2013, 224; Wendt 1999, 155-

165), is taken into account as beliefs on the same three levels. In this article, the coherent system of ideas based on the three planes of worldviews, and principled and causal beliefs, is considered an ideology that is more pertinent to the conceptualization of ideas as collective knowledge (c.f. Brommesson and Ekengren 2013, 5-6). In democratic societies, foreign policy elites share foreign policy ideologies at the decision-making level, ideologies that also have the partisan support of some segments of the public. However, for normative principles to make their way into policy action, the agency of the foreign policy elites is required to make the causal link (Berman 2013; Risse 2011; Risse-Kappen 1994). After all, “ideas do not float freely” (Risse-Kappen 1994). Therefore, our focus is on the ideas of (South Korean) presidents (Hudson 2014), who reflect different political ideologies as concerns their North Korea policies.

Using the above theoretical framework, we analyze to what extent democratic regime changes in South Korea, which are understood as changes in central leadership, or more specifically as shifts between conservative and progressive administrations (Hagan 1989, 144-145), alter the country’s foreign policy interests and behavior vis-à-vis North Korea. Primarily this chapter seeks to understand South Korea’s North Korea policy changes measured in terms of progressive and conservative governments’ behaviors associated with the inter-Korean people-to-people social and cultural exchanges (in areas such as joint activities in the fields of culture, the arts, research, religion, science, sports, health care and journalism), and these activities’ contributions to the revival of a socio-cultural community on the Korean Peninsula (Ministry of Unification 2015). We do not assume the role of structural changes to be unimportant; nor is it possible to completely isolate the impact of structural changes on the South Korean governments’ North Korea policies (Brommesson and Ekengren 2013; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 294). In other words, the claim here is not that ideas explain all of the foreign policy changes. That is, “it is not ‘ideas all the way down’” (Hudson 2014, 11; see also Keohane 2000; Wendt 1999, 110-113).

The timeframe covered is from 1998 to 2018, spanning five governments—two progressives, two conservatives and one progressive—respectively representing two regime changes from one opposite end of the established South Korean political spectrum to the other. Furthermore, how North Korea-related ideas and ideologies are *formed* are beyond the scope of this analysis, as this work is interested in how given ideas and ideologies *shape* the South’s North Korea-related interests and policies (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 7).

### **Inter-Korean Social and Cultural Exchanges**

The Korean peninsula was divided in two immediately following the end of World War II. At first, the new and artificial border was a temporary military demarcation line between the American and Soviet occupations of southern and northern part of the peninsula. After the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), the line of division became the four-kilometer-wide Demilitarized

Zone (DMZ) that was established to maintain the newly negotiated armistice. Two separate governments were formed on both sides of the DMZ, both claiming to be the only legitimate government on the peninsula. The status of the armistice, which came without a peace agreement or official diplomatic recognition, continued even after the end of the Cold War, extending the context of the Cold War around the Korean peninsula until today. Both North and South Korea define each other as a security threat.

Following the division, both countries strictly prohibited civilian contact or visits as they proclaimed them illegal and dangerous behavior. The National Security Law of South Korea, first enacted in 1948, banned any people-to-people contact with North Koreans without prior approval. Until the end of the Cold War in Europe during the late 1980s, inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges were pronounced but did not materialize. The Soviet Union's opening up to the world through perestroika and glasnost policies, and South Korea's surpassing of North Korea in virtually every dimension, brought about the reconsideration of inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges (Ayhan and Jang 2019). Through the Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity (July 7, 1988), the Roh Tae Woo government legalized people-to-people inter-Korean contact. The Declaration called for the expansion of inter-Korean relations for a prosperous and unified nation, and people-to-people exchange and cooperation projects were deemed important to that end (Roh 1988). The first article in the declaration highlighted the need for social and cultural exchanges between the people of the two Koreas in the fields of business, journalism, religion, culture and the arts, sports, and academia (Roh 1988).

Since the Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity, South Koreans have been able to contact and visit their North Korean counterparts after receiving approval from the South Korean government. Under the broad definition of people-to-people exchanges, these social and cultural exchanges covered non-political, non-economic, people-to-people cooperation in all of the above-mentioned fields (Ministry of Unification 2001, 34). The initial stage of these people-to-people exchanges, which took place during the 1990s, received much attention and there was a lot of hope; however, the first steps were still cautious and small in scale. It was only after the election of the first progressive government, under Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), when these exchanges were vitalized. The policy shifts began with the inauguration of the Kim Dae Jung government into office, which was followed by two democratic regime changes in South Korea, from progressive to conservative in 2008 and back to progressive in 2017.

The number of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects increased dramatically under the progressive governments of Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008), including social and cultural programs. These exchanges began under Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992), who led a conservative administration, but it was during the first progressive government of Kim Dae Jung that these exchanges gained momentum; they continued under his progressive successor Roh Moo Hyun. The current Moon Jae In government (2017~), another progressive administration, came to power in 2017. Despite that being a tense year regarding North Korea,

the Moon Jae In government's second year was one of the most active years of social and cultural exchanges between the two Koreas, despite heavy sanctions against the North that also limited South Korea's maneuvering. Under the conservative governments from 2008 to 2016, however, inter-Korean social and cultural exchanges were mostly suspended despite the rhetoric of the importance of these exchanges continuing unchanged. Prior to 1998, when Kim Dae Jung became president, only three applicants were given permission to undertake inter-Korean social and cultural cooperation projects; on the other hand, between 1998 and 2008, 149 applications were accepted (Ministry of Unification 2020). During the last 14 months of the Roh Moo Hyun administration, 22 projects were permitted (including three projects in January and February of 2008, the last two months of the outgoing Roh government) (Ministry of Unification 2013c). The subsequent Lee Myung Bak government did not permit any projects in its first two years (Ministry of Unification 2020). Within the nine-year-period of conservative rule under Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye, only five inter-Korean social and cultural exchange cooperation projects were permitted (Ministry of Unification 2020). In 2018, six social and cultural exchange projects were permitted under the progressive Moon Jae In government.

**Table 1: Approvals of Inter-Korean Cooperation Projects** (Number of Cases)

Category		'91~ '01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	Total	
Economic exchanges	Humanitarian aid	16	1	2	6	10	4	6	9	1	19	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	93	
	Kaesong Industrial Complex	Approval	-	-	-	17	26	15	163	53	10	6	1	6	5	3	3	-	-	-	308
		Report	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	11	18	22	10	2	7	-	-	-	82
Social and cultural exchanges		23	7	13	16	47	26	19	3	-	1	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	6	165	
Total		39	8	15	39	83	45	188	65	23	37	20	28	34	6	12	-	-	6	648	

**Adapted from:** Ministry of Unification (2020)

In the next section, we explore what might have caused this 180-degree change in South Korea's North Korea policies. More specifically, we analyze the role of structural changes, stimuli coming from North Korea, and the role of ideas in South Korea's change of North Korea policies.

### Alternative Explanations for Changes in Policy

The first democratic regime change from a conservative government to a progressive one took place in 1998. The presidency went back to the conservatives in 2008, and again to a progressive government in 2017, representing two regime changes. The null hypothesis suggests that if there had not been structural change on the Korean peninsula or stimuli from North Korea, each government should have followed more or less consistent North Korea policies. If there had been

structural change, we would expect to see shifts in the South's North Korea policies corresponding to these changes. As mentioned above, the most significant changes on the Korean peninsula following the Korean War occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. South Korea surpassed North Korea economically and assumed the upper hand in the balance of power on the Korean peninsula (Cha 2003, 20; D. Kang 2003; Ku 2018). The late 1980s saw the Soviet Union change its stance against the capitalist world and eventually end the Cold War with the collapse of Soviet Union. The nuclear ambitions of North Korea, which date back to the 1980s (Cha 2003), surfaced during the nuclear crisis of 1992-1994 (D. Kang 2003). All of these changes corresponded to significant structural changes that have had consequences on the balance of power on the Korean peninsula and, hence, naturally on South Korea's North Korea policies.

In the period we cover in this chapter, 1998-2018, North Korea policy changes do not correlate with the changes in terms of the structure or the stimuli from North Korea. The regional system and inter-state relations in East Asia went through a large-scale transformation after the end of the Cold War. Russia had lost its interest in and capability to support North Korea and had turned toward the South for its economic relations. China was also busy with its own economic development, and the two former socialist comrades normalized their relations with South Korea. The North Korean economy declined into the Arduous March during the 1990s. Since the late 1990s, North Korea has tried to contact and normalize relations with capitalist countries, especially the US, which seemed to be the key to the regime's security and economic recovery (Bluth 2011, 3). The rise of China and the deepened Sino-South Korean economic relationship has been a fixed element since the 1990s. China rapidly emerged as a strong stakeholder in the region and the world by expanding its economic relations and influence. US security policy in Asia has been realigned with an aim to control or contain China by strengthening its ties and alliances in the region. South Korea's economic partnership with China initiated a debate on a possible change in US-ROK relations, but this latter alliance was continuously regarded as the most fundamental and important strategy in the geopolitical order (Snyder 2009, 1-4). The competition between the US and China and the influence of each country have become a background to and a long-term factor in inter-Korean issues in a continuous trend that covers the period of study of this article.

The one area in which the US-South Korea alliance might function to affect South Korean policy on the North is Washington's and Seoul's comparative appetites for engagement or confrontation with Pyongyang. However, although the sample size is relatively small, this factor does not seem to indicate this particular structural feature of the regional international system—that is, the US-South Korea alliance—tended to account for variation in South Korean policy towards the North. To wit, the overlap of presidents Bill Clinton (center-left) and Kim Dae Jung (progressive) does not offer much for analysis in the context of this study as their respective ideological and policy orientations were in alignment, including vis-à-vis North Korea. Thus the US policy position could not have functioned as a factor to push Kim toward a more engagement-oriented position,



as it was already a position for which Kim was long known. The situation was different with US president George W. Bush, however, whose rhetoric (axis of evil) and policy (withdrawal from the Agreed Framework) would presumably have functioned as a brake on South Korea's engagement policies vis-à-vis North Korea under progressives Kim Dae Jung and his successor, Roh Moo Hyun. However, both presidents' administrations advanced their so-called Sunshine Policy aggressively during the G.W. Bush administration, and despite its emphasis on isolating and weakening Pyongyang. The Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye administrations were both conservative and largely rolled back engagement with North Korea. This was fully in line with the policies of both the G.W. Bush administration (as mentioned previously) and the Democratic Barack Obama administration, which, aside from none attempt at North Korean engagement (the failed 2012 "Leap Day" agreement), adopted a North Korea policy called "strategic patience," which was skeptically neglectful of North Korea at best and hawkish at worst. In the final ideological spectrum transition within the domain of this article, current South Korean president Moon Jae In, a progressive who entered office with the intent to advance Sunshine 2.0, a renewal of previous progressive engagement policies with Pyongyang, did so despite the Trump administration's hostile ("fire and fury") rhetoric of 2017, and overall skepticism about the value of diplomacy with North Korea. In sum, changes in US policy towards North Korea did not seem to affect the tendency of South Korean governments' North Korea policies. In turn, this strengthens our argument that South Korea's North Korea policy behaviors are influenced by genuinely South Korean ideas and interests, rather than being imposed by an external power such as the US.

Regarding the stimuli from North Korea, both the conventional military clashes that occurred from time to time and the nuclear crisis were constant threats and continued without much change throughout these years, influencing relations on the Korean peninsula. The number of local military skirmishes and clashes between the two Koreas decreased compared to those during the Cold War era, but they still occurred in the West Sea or along the DMZ. However, these stimuli did not concentrate only during the period of conservative governments. Indeed, some of the most significant military skirmishes, including the Yeonpyeong Battle (1999) and the battle in the Yellow Sea (2002, the Second Yeonpyeong Battle), occurred during periods of progressive governments.

**Table 2: Major Clashes between Militaries of South and North Korea, 1998-2016**

Year/Month	Military Skirmishes and Clashes
1999/06	North Korean patrol boats crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) of West Sea / the First Battle of Yeonpyeong
2002/06	North Korean patrol boats crossed the NLL / the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong
2003/10	North Korean patrol boats crossed the NLL / warning shots by

	South Korean Navy
2004/07	North Korean patrol boats crossed the NLL / gun fire by South Korean Navy
2004/11	North Korean patrol boats crossed the NLL / warning shots by South Korean Navy
2009/11	North Korean patrol boats crossed the NLL / the Battle of Daecheong
2010/03	Navy patrol ship 'Cheonan' was sunk by North Korean torpedo attack
2010/11	Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean Army
2014/03	North Korea fired 500 coastal guns across the NLL / response fire by South Korean Navy
2015/08	Two South Korean soldiers were seriously injured in a land mine explosion south of the DMZ

**Source:** Bae (2015)

North Korea's nuclear program and missile tests and capacity were also consistently carried out during this period despite international efforts and cooperation to prevent its nuclear development. The number and intensity of nuclear and missile tests varied from time to time, but the growing threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles continued throughout the period. The major developments of the North Korean nuclear crisis, including the admission of having uranium-based nuclear programs (2003), withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (2003) and a first nuclear test (2006) occurred under progressive governments. The year 2017, when the progressive Moon Jae In came to power, was one of the tensest times for inter-Korean relations. Nevertheless, South Korea's North Korea policies did not see as much dramatic change from the stimuli that came from North Korea as did the democratic regime change in the country. The ideological differences between the conservative and progressive governments brought about more significant shifts to how interests and policies vis-à-vis North Korea were shaped.

If the radical changes in South Korea's North Korea policies were due to pressure coming from other countries, particularly the US, on which South Korea had been relying for its security since its independence, it might have been argued that ideas, in this case those stemming from overseas being imposed upon South Korea, led to a change in its foreign policy behavior without changing the country's interests. However, as we analyze below, South Korean ideas about how to deal with North Korea are internal ideas that are strongly associated with the ideologies of the established political spectrum in South Korea. Therefore, once these ideas make their way into policymaking by those who win presidential elections, they first shape how South Korea's interests are defined in relation to North Korea and, in turn, influence its foreign policy behavior toward its northern neighbor.

The shifts in South Korea's interests and foreign policies vis-a-vis the North cannot be explained through structural changes or the stimuli that came from the US or North Korea. Hence, we now turn to how differences in ideas and, collectively, in ideologies, can explain these shifts in policy and interests. Hagan (1989, 156) suggests that when analyzing foreign policy behavior by using regime change as an independent variable, one must show that changes in a country's foreign policy behavior between different regimes vary more significantly within the same regimes. The following analysis aims to show that the between-regimes variance is greater than the within-regime variance in the case of South Korea's North Korea policies.

## **Ideas Matter in Policies**

### *Worldview of Progressives and Conservatives: A Shared Vision of Peace and Unification*

Both the conservatives and the progressives agree on the importance of peace on the Korean peninsula. All policies related to North Korea and inter-Korean projects aim towards a peaceful unification in the future. Regardless of their political orientation, South Korean political elites and leaders share a worldview of the common and unchanging goal of the eventual unification of the two Koreas. They are also in consensus on the common worldview which take for granted that Korea is one country that had only been divided temporarily against the Korean people's will and that it is most natural that it be unified in the future, but through peace and not another war (D.-J. Kim 1998; Lee 2008; Moon 2017a). Kim (2012) refers to this shared worldview as liberalism, the progressives' version being more defensive with an emphasis on coexistence, and the conservatives' version being more offensive with an emphasis on reciprocity. In a similar vein, Lim (2010) refers to the progressives' goals as aiming to achieve relational peace and the conservatives' goals, ultimate peace; but the progressives and conservatives, nevertheless, share the worldview of peace on the Korean peninsula. The differences between the progressives and the conservatives occur at two other planes of ideas, namely principled and causal beliefs, which we analyze below.

### *Principled Beliefs of Progressive Governments (1998-2008, 2017~)*

The Kim Dae Jung government openly emphasized the importance of mutual understanding with North Korea for maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula. In his inauguration speech, Kim Dae-Jung emphasized that "unification should be a peaceful process and a successful one both for the North and the South together," and he expressed his belief that "the engagement policy toward North Korea would take a long time but would certainly reach a successful result" (D.-J. Kim 1998, 4). This belief became the principle of a progressive policy toward the North, under the name of Sunshine Policy, placing emphasis on engagement that would bring peace and success in the long term. The Kim Dae Jung government did not believe that the North would

easily collapse, despite the famine of the late 1990s. If North Korea were not to collapse in the short term, then engaging it in catalyzing gradual positive change, including bringing in reforms and opening up, was regarded as a more effective policy. Kim Dae Jung noted that “North Korea is most dangerous when it is isolated” (Cho 2009, 95). Engaging North Korea was an intentional “transformative process of security culture” aimed at reconfiguring the intersubjective identities of the two Koreas as friendly others and, hence, socializing the North to not be an outcast and security threat. Thereby it would be contributing to peace and stability in the region (Cho 2009, 95). Immediately after its inauguration, in 1998, the Kim Dae Jung government was convinced that inter-Korean dialogue was a prerequisite for peace on the Korean peninsula (Ministry of Unification 2003, 47).

During the Kim Dae-Jung government, interdependence was emphasized in every field so as to consolidate peace with North Korea. The principled belief of the progressives was framed in terms of the country’s long-term interests, which were based on a win-win partnership with North Korea and emphasized absolute gains for both Koreas. With deepening interdependence through increasing cooperation, the progressives hoped to see a gradual change in North Korea in terms of its economic, social, and political aspects. The thinking was that, with North Korea having slowly changed in a peaceful relationship, it would be possible for the South to enjoy more peace and prosperity without concerns over security threats from the North. In his speech, in 2000 after the first summit and the June 15<sup>th</sup> Declaration with Kim Jong-Il, President Kim Dae Jung mentioned this belief and asked for more support from the people of South Korea. He thought that it was possible to reconcile and cooperate in the longer term only when both sides gain something positive together (D.-J. Kim 2000). The Kim Dae Jung government believed that doing something together would meet the interests of both North and South Korea in the future. The emphasis was on long-term absolute gains, although the gains may have been to the disadvantage of South Korea in the short-term because of the one-sided financial burden of its engagement policies towards the North. The Kim administration suggested that while mutuality is emphasized, “given the circumstances and conditions of South and North, the amount and kind of what are given and taken and the timing cannot be the same” (Ministry of Unification 1998, 16). This idea was laid out in the first unification white paper under a progressive government. In a similar vein, the Kim Dae Jung government asked for more understanding from South Koreans, noting that the North Korean people have been living under a very different ideological and political system, and solving inter-Korean problems requires a long-term approach (D.-J. Kim 2000).

Similar principled beliefs continued in the policy frame of the Roh Moo Hyun government, which carried out a Peace and Prosperity Policy similar to the Sunshine Policy to continuously engage the North for mutual understanding in a long-term perspective. The Roh government also believed in win-win cooperation, using similar terms such as co-prosperity, mutual benefit, and economic community in the future (Ministry of Unification 2004, 28). Although there were a number of serious security crises, the expectations for the short- and long-term effects of the

social and cultural exchanges continued until the mid-2000s. The Kim Dae Jung government could not deny the seriousness of the security crises in the West Sea, in 1999 and 2002. The nuclear crisis from 2002 onward added to the tension on the Korean peninsula. Despite all of these security concerns, the progressive governments did not let go of the belief that the Korean people would be able to overcome the peninsular problems, including the nuclear issue, through peaceful means in close cooperation with the international community (Ministry of Unification 2003, Foreword). Engaging North Korea was regarded as being fundamental to South Korea's security interests as it helped avoid war on the Peninsula, which no South Koreans or international investors wanted (S.B. Kim 2012, 343-344).

The current progressive president, Moon Jae In, who came to power after nine years of conservative governments, followed the principled beliefs of his progressive predecessors regarding inter-Korean relations and peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. He officially announced that his policies, such as the New Economic Map for the Korean Peninsula and the New Northern Policy, inherited the spirit of the Roh Moo Hyun government's policies for inter-Korean relations (Moon 2017b, 370-374). With the inauguration of his administration, Moon Jae In announced a North Korean policy that had two visions, one of "peaceful coexistence" and the other of "co-prosperity," and three policy goals of a "permanent peace settlement," "sustainable inter-Korean relations," and a "new economic community on the Korean Peninsula" (Ministry of Unification 2017b, 14-21). Using similar terms and policy goals, the progressive governments openly shared the normative frame in the spirit of the Sunshine Policy.

### ***Causal Beliefs of Progressive Governments (1998-2008, 2017~)***

Based on their normative policy frames, the progressive governments aimed to engage North Korea in efforts at reconciliation, beginning with the administration of Kim Dae Jung and its pursuit of various cooperation projects with the North. Inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges, including social and cultural ones, were vitalized following the same logic. These projects were seen as the causal links that convert normative principles into policy outcomes, reflecting the causal beliefs of these progressive governments. The Kim Dae Jung administration aimed to separate economic, social and cultural exchanges and cooperation from political or security concerns. This separation was deemed necessary to guarantee the sustainability of the types of exchanges and cooperation that would reframe the relationship between the North and South as partners for the future.

Progressive governments pursued the expansion of interactions and exchanges in fields that would be easier for North Korea to agree to: sports, culture, the arts, religion, and academia (Ministry of Unification 2000, Foreword). In his speech after the June 15<sup>th</sup> Declaration in 2000, Kim Dae Jung declared that he agreed with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il "to expand exchanges and cooperation not only in economic fields but also in all social and cultural fields, including the arts and sports." The aim of that approach was to solve easy and possible issues

together first and to “build trust and understand each other in this process” (D.-J. Kim 2000). Inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation were emphasized as the most significant approaches to reconciliation and peace (Ministry of Unification 2000, 16). The expected outcome was a gradual change of North Korea that would, in due course, lead to political change for permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. In this process, social and cultural exchange projects were safe and utilizable tools thanks to their less conflictual nature. The long-term goal was the socialization of the people of the two Koreas and the recategorizing of their identity as *Koreans*, rather than remaining alienated and antagonistic *South* or *North Koreans* (Ayhan and Jang 2019). The short-term goal was to reduce the hostilities between North and South Korean people. The government “expected that the hostility of North Korean people against South Korea would somewhat decrease” by having more contact through social and cultural exchanges (Ministry of Unification 2003, 36).

In the same progressive logic, the Roh Moo Hyun government was determined to continue these social and cultural exchanges and cooperation projects. This government emphasized the need for more of these exchanges “as another ‘axis’ for a wider and stronger ‘basis’ of North-South relations” to extend relations, reconcile the two countries and bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula (B.-J. Kim 2008, 304). The Roh government assigned a high value to the impact of people-to-people social and cultural programs, noting that those events “contributed significantly to improving the mood of reconciliation and cooperation and fostering the will of future unification” (Ministry of Unification 2004, 184). The government continuously supported people-to-people exchange programs as they had “increased the traffic between the North and South by over a hundred-thousand people a year” by 2007, and had been quite effective in stabilizing and sustaining the cooperative momentum of North-South relations (Ministry of Unification 2007, 18). The progressive governments positively assessed these people-to-people social and cultural exchanges as providing a sustainable buffer between the two Koreas for future development. People-to-people social and cultural exchanges, including local-government projects, were believed to be “useful to expanding mutual understanding by promoting broad participation of the people of the North and South in various fields” (Ministry of Unification 2007, 89). In this frame, these civilian-led exchanges took the role of a special motivational force that aimed to develop inter-Korean relations and to continuously promote the long-term perspective of these relations (Ministry of Unification 2004, 184). By expanding social and cultural exchanges, the progressives also aimed to build up mutual trust and minimize the types of cultural and emotional conflicts that could stand in the way of the future unification of the North and South (Ministry of Unification 2008, 175). This approach was the beginning of a very long-term preparation for a unification that would be considered after a certain level of change in North Korea and the development of inter-Korean relations.

Following a nine-year hiatus in almost all inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects, the election of the progressive Moon Jae In government brought about a fresh start in inter-Korean relations. After his first summit meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, on April 27,

2018, Moon Jae In promised that officials from both countries would work together to revive the people-to-people exchange programs as soon as possible (Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee 2018). The April 27 summit meeting paid particular attention to social and cultural exchanges, including joint cultural events and joint participation in international sports competitions, which were believed “to give further momentum to the atmosphere of national reconciliation and unity” (J.U. Kim and Moon 2018). While the Moon government wanted to push forward and expand the exchange and cooperation programs, strong international sanctions against North Korea limited its ability to do so. Despite the hurdles in denuclearization talks and the sanctions against North Korea, social and cultural exchange projects were revived to some extent (Ministry of Culture Sports and Tourism Public Relations Office 2019); and President Moon reinforced his commitment to revitalizing inter-Korean social and cultural exchanges at every opportunity (Ministry of Unification 2019, 120; Moon 2020; Choe 2020).

### *Principled Beliefs of Conservative Governments (2008-2017)*

The conservatives had developed an inherent distrust of North Korea throughout North-South relations. This distrust stemmed from vivid memories of the Korean War and a series of incidents that occurred between the North and South. For the conservatives, it has been impossible to trust the North Korean regime in relation to South Korea’s security and peace in Northeast Asia, particularly as the two Koreas are still officially at war.

The Lee Myung Bak government was inaugurated in 2008, having displaced the progressives in the election wherein they had criticized the Sunshine Policy. The Lee Myung Bak administration’s North Korea approach aimed to pressure it into changing its attitudes and policies. The progressives’ engagement policy was regarded as a failure due to the lack of reciprocity. The conservatives saw the Sunshine Policy as pouring South Korean cash into North Korea, effectively contributing to the North Korean regime’s survival and nuclear development (Chosun Ilbo 2010). The Lee Myung Bak government introduced a new principle of not providing further economic assistance or encouraging cooperation until North Korea gave up its nuclear weapons development program (J. Kang 2013). Putting security and economic relations together in one frame, both Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye governments interpreted the former governments’ engagement policies towards North Korea as having been a failure as they allowed North Korea to develop nuclear capabilities, and this put the South at risk (Ministry of Unification 2013a, 14). For the conservatives, the progressives’ North Korea policies had been unable to prevent the occurrence of military skirmishes on the peninsula despite the expansion of economic exchange and cooperation. The conservatives believed that the progressive governments’ long-term focus had allowed room for unequal gains in the short-term.

The conservative governments saw the security of South Korea as being their primary goal, and this meant that the denuclearization of North Korea took precedence over anything else (Ministry of Unification 2013a, 14-15; see also Ministry of Unification 2010, 20). The Park Geun Hye

government maintained this policy priority until 2016. They emphasized short-term security concerns and absolute gains in their North Korea policy frames. While agreeing with the goal of having a peaceful unification in the future, one with no more war on the peninsula, the conservatives believed that a policy of containment and heightened pressure would encourage North Korea to give up its nuclear development program and change its regime (G.-H. Park 2016b). The main idea had been to isolate North Korea, economically and politically, in the hope a regime change, or even collapse.

The security-first policy strengthened following North Korea's nuclear tests and inter-Korean hostilities. There were two significant inter-Korean hostilities during Lee Myung Bak's presidency. On March 26, 2010 the South Korean navy ship Cheonan was sunk, killing 46 South Korean soldiers, for which the South blamed a North Korean attack (Sudworth 2010). On November 23 of the same year, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island following South Korean artillery exercises in the West Sea. After the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, the Lee Myung Bak government used strong words openly criticizing North Korea. These military skirmishes only "added to the long list of continuous North Korean armed provocations from the time of the Korean War" (Ministry of Unification 2013a, 8).

The Lee Myung-Bak government asserted that the most important thing for a healthier inter-Korean relationship based on mutual benefit and common prosperity was to address the North Korean nuclear issue (Ministry of Unification 2010, 15). This government's policy was termed Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness Policy, entailing that if North Korea denuclearized first and opened up the country, then South Korea would assist in raising North Korea's per capita GDP to \$US3,000 within 10 years. It aimed to use the concept of mutual benefit and common prosperity to incentivize North Korea to give up its nuclear development by assisting its economic development and international cooperation along with the process of denuclearization (Seo 2008). However, North Korea rejected this policy. Inter-Korean dialogue and many cooperation projects were cancelled, except for the Kaeseong Industrial Complex, which had come to involve many South Korean companies over a number of years.

The Park government (2013-2017) shared the Lee Myung Bak government's ideas on security-first. After North Korea's fourth nuclear test, in January 2016, the Park government shut down the Kaeseong Industrial Complex in February that year. Almost all relations with the North were discontinued. The government defined the situation as being one of a serious security threat, one where "North Korea would not show any change in its attitude, such as in denuclearization, but conducted military provocation" against the South Korean people (G.-H. Park 2016c). During the presidential election campaign, Park Geun Hye raised the concept of trust-building between the North and South and named the policy the Korean Peninsula Trust-Building Process. With this policy frame, she suggested that if the North and South could build trust and make progress toward denuclearization, then its government would expand its humanitarian assistance to the North and install offices for the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation program in both Seoul and Pyongyang (G.-h. Park 2014). Her policy of trust-building, wherein she had asked North



Korea to change its attitude first and give up its nuclear development, was essentially the same approach as that of Lee Myung Bak. Park declared that her government “will pursue the ‘Vision Korea Project’ to build the economic community of the Korean Peninsula, along with making progress in trust-building and denuclearization” (Y.-H. Park 2013). The only difference between this policy and the former conservative policy frame of the Lee Myung Bak government were the slight changes in the wording so as to make it more attractive to North Korea.

The Park government believed that the exchanges and cooperation could be continued but should be limited due to considerations over South Korean security. North Korea would not receive economic benefits unless denuclearization came first. This principle was strengthened after North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches. North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in 2013, and its fourth and fifth in 2016. The Park administration expressed deep disappointment and put an even higher priority on the peninsula’s security environment, giving full support to the UN-led international sanctions on North Korea and the even stronger sanctions the US had announced (G.-H. Park 2016a). As international sanctions on North Korea intensified, the Park government officially withdrew its trust-building process and, instead, cooperated with the US and the international community in putting more pressure on the North. When United Nations Security Council Resolutions enforced sanctions on the country, this proved to be the global acknowledgement of the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear problem (Ministry of Unification 2017a, 50).

### *Causal Beliefs of Conservative Governments (2008-2017)*

Building on their principled beliefs regarding North Korea policies, the conservative governments deemed the people-to-people exchanges to be costly, inefficient and ineffective in both a political and economic sense. They saw the exchanges as having been a failure and as showing the limits of economic exchange and cooperation in terms of guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula (Joo 2014). These exchanges and cooperation programs had not initiated any change in North Korea but, instead, seemed to have helped the North Korean regime survive longer. For the conservatives, politics and the economy could not be separated in inter-Korean relations. Having to deal with the issues of North Korean nuclear development and missile testing meant the people-to-people exchanges and cooperation could not be supported; this would go against the international sanctions that had been put in place. Also, putting a halt to these exchanges was intended to show South Korea as remaining strong in its stance against a nuclear North Korea. Cultural events or social meetings were only symbolic and lacked in substance in relation to continuing the South’s relationship with North Koreans.

The official assessment of the ten years of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects under progressive governments was that these projects had ignored pressing humanitarian issues, such as South Korean prisoners of war not being returned home, separated families and abductees and, hence, falling behind the South Korean people’s expectations (Ministry of Unification 2010, 17).

The conservatives felt that inter-Korean cooperation should have emphasized the direction of pursuing mutual interests, and each exchange and cooperation project should have been open and transparent in terms of their process (Ministry of Unification 2013a, 15). Failing to ask for transparency was a key criticism of the Sunshine Policy, since North Korea had never cooperated in providing detailed information about how the money or the materials for exchange programs was being used.

When the Lee Myung Bak administration was elected in December 2007, it wanted to present a different policy based on a rationalist approach for the security of South Korea. As such, it took a pragmatic view to redefining the country's North Korea policy. Lee called for the kind of "creative pragmatism" that prioritized achieving actual outcomes through feasible policies that were designed to deal with urgent problems (Ministry of Unification 2010, 17). After the Cheonan ship incident, in 2010, the South Korean government imposed sanctions against North Korea under the name of the May 24 Measures. These measures prohibited all kinds of exchanges and cooperation with the North, including humanitarian aid projects, unless the government recognized this aid as being an exception. Due to the aggravated North-South relations and the May 24 Measures, all social and cultural exchanges had been discontinued since May 2010. The Lee government only permitted social and cultural exchanges on rare occasions. A limited number of exchanges were allowed to relieve tensions and manage the situation, but the size and content of these exchanges were greatly reduced and became increasingly less sustainable.

In rhetoric, the conservative Lee Myung Bak and the Park Geun Hye governments still emphasized the importance of people-to-people exchanges in general. They often mentioned how critical social and cultural exchanges were and they also wanted to continue the programs in these fields. When Park Geun Hye became president of South Korea, she presented an agenda that included a long list of exchanges with North Korea. She promised to upgrade and systemize these economic, social and cultural exchanges to promote mutual interests, if North Korea denuclearized and helped build mutual trust (Ministry of Unification 2013a, Foreword). Park promised to establish Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Offices, both in Seoul and Pyongyang, to support these exchanges (Ministry of Unification 2013b, 17). Since the government wanted to build mutual trust, it considered that this could begin "in non-political, non-military, and humanitarian fields first" (Ministry of Unification 2013a, Foreword). The Park government declared that they wanted "to continue the humanitarian assistance for vulnerable social groups and the social and cultural exchange programs, regardless of the political tension" (Ministry of Unification 2014, 21). However, these aims only remained in rhetoric.

After North Korea launched a long-range missile in 2012, South Korea published its 2013 Unification White Paper, wherein it increased its security concerns, suggesting that "the North-South exchanges and cooperation should be carefully readjusted," prioritizing the safety of South Korean citizens (Ministry of Unification 2013a, 27). The Park Geun Hye government also interpreted the inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges as threatening the lives and prosperity

of the South Korean people, noting that the North might be utilizing these exchanges as a tool to justify its logic” (Ministry of Unification 2017a, 56). The conservatives questioned the appropriateness of continuing the inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges and cooperation projects while at the same time trying to take a firm stand against North Korea’s nuclear development. Engagement with North Korea when it would not stop its threatening provocations and continuing the people-to-people exchanges in any field would only support the North and, thereby, increase the South’s security risks. It was more important for South Korea to show its strong will against the nuclear North. Stopping these inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects demonstrated this will to North Korea and the international community.

In short, for the conservatives, North Korea was earning easy cash while also continuing to be a threat to the South and not showing any sign of a change in its behavior. The South’s social and cultural exchange projects in the North had to be stopped. The findings in this paper are summarized in Table 3.

**Table 3. Summary of Alternative Explanations and Ideas in South Korean Governments’ North Korea Policies**

<b>Government</b>	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Alternative Explanation: Structural changes and Stimuli from North Korea</b>	<b>Alternative Explanation: US Influence on South Korean Governments</b>	<b>Ideas Matter: Interests and Policies vis-à-vis North Korea</b>
Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003)	Progressive	Nuclear North Korea  Occasional inter-Korean clashes	Clinton era (engagement policies in line with US' engagement policies)  Bush era (engagement policies, contradicting US' hardline policies)	Interests: long-term; peaceful coexistence  Principled beliefs: Engagement  Causal beliefs: Encouragement of social and cultural exchanges
Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008)	Progressive	Nuclear North Korea  Occasional inter-Korean clashes	Bush era (engagement policies, contradicting US' hardline policies)	Interests: long-term; peaceful coexistence  Principled beliefs: Engagement  Causal beliefs: Encouragement of social and cultural exchanges
Lee Myung Bak (2008-2013)	Conservative	Nuclear North Korea  Occasional inter-Korean clashes	Bush era (hardline policies in line with US' hardline policies)  Obama era (hardline policies, in line with US' hardline policies)	Interests: short-term; immediate security concerns  Principled beliefs: Isolation  Causal beliefs: Virtual halting of social and cultural exchanges
Park Geun Hye (2013-2017)	Conservative	Nuclear North Korea	Obama era (hardline policies, in line with US')	Interests: short-term; immediate security concerns

		Occasional inter-Korean clashes	hardline policies)	Principled beliefs: Isolation  Causal beliefs: Virtual halting of social and cultural exchanges
Moon Jae In (2017~)	Progressive	Nuclear North Korea  Occasional inter-Korean clashes	Trump era (engagement policies contradicting US' hardline policies)	Interests: long-term; peaceful coexistence  Principled beliefs: Engagement  Causal beliefs: Encouragement of social and cultural exchanges

## Conclusion

This chapter shows that South Korea's policy changes in relation to the North correspond to democratic regime changes rather than to structural changes or stimuli coming from North Korea or the United States. The regime changes between the conservative and progressive governments brought new ideas to policymaking, which in turn shaped South Korea's interests and foreign policy behaviors vis-à-vis the North. While sharing the worldview of peace and unification, the progressives and the conservatives had opposing principled and causal beliefs.

On one hand, the progressives believed that South Korea should emphasize long-term interests and absolute gains in its relations with the North. These normative ideas were translated into engagement policies, including the encouragement of inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges, despite the military tensions across the border. The conservatives, on the other hand, believed that South Korea should emphasize immediate security interests and relative gains in its relations with the North. While agreeing with the idea of inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges in rhetoric, their causal beliefs followed the logic that North Korea must be isolated and contained in every dimension. For the conservatives, the South's engagement only strengthened North Korea's capabilities, and also endangered South Korea's security. These fundamental differences in the principled and causal beliefs of two ideologies caused radical policy shifts following regime changes in South Korea. The progressive governments vitalized the inter-Korean people-to-people social and cultural exchanges as part of their engagement policies vis-à-vis North Korea. The conservative governments almost put a complete halt to these exchanges as part of their isolation policies vis-à-vis North Korea.

Through this chapter, we contribute to an understanding of the way that South Korea's approach to the North can open up (or close down) pathways to inter-Korean reconciliation, above and beyond what may be accounted for by structural factors. One notes also that the conclusion of our argument connects with literature on how ideas matter in changing states' interests and foreign policy behaviors. Our case study has looked at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy and, in turn, lends to a further understanding of domestic actors' significance in international relations. This work also has laid out the South Korean governments' ideas, interests and policies and the differences between these factors following regime changes. The in-depth nature of the analysis in this chapter thus helps us uncover other elements of inter-Korean social and cultural exchanges that could be investigated in future studies.

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